HUMANE PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF PROGRESS

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Abstract
According to some recent critics, philosophy has not progressed over the course of its history because it has not exhibited any substantial increase in the stock of human wisdom. I reject this pessimistic conclusion by arguing that such criticisms employ a conception of progress drawn from the sciences which is inapplicable to a humanistic discipline such as philosophy. Philosophy should not be understood as the accumulation of epistemic goods in a manner analogous to the natural sciences. I argue that the progressiveness of philosophy consists, if anything, in its capacity to provoke and sustain critical reflections upon the ideas and practices which shape and guide human life.

I. Anxieties, Old and New

The question of how, if at all philosophy might be said to ‘progress’ is an old one. The very question itself may be judged to be narcissistic, jejune, or even dangerous, as if asking the question necessarily indicates any live doubts about the possibility of an affirmative answer. My aim in this paper is not to replay the history or significance of the question, but to take issue with one recent answer to it, namely, Rupert Read’s recent claim that philosophy has not substantially progressed since Plato because, although it has grown older, it has not grown correspondingly wiser. Although Read is far from alone in making this gloomy judgement, his arguments do offer a useful opportunity to clarify just which conception of ‘progress’ one should appeal to, as well as indicating an important use for the idea of ‘humane philosophy’ recently advocated by Bernard Williams and John Cottingham.

Read’s gloomy judgement is supported by a comparison of Plato and Rawls’s political theories, upon which basis Read con-

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cludes that if philosophy is, as Alfred North Whitehead famously put it, a ‘series of footnotes to Plato’, then it ‘would be better if some of these footnotes had never been written’ because some such ‘footnotes’ – by which Read apparently means both certain philosophers and whole schools of thought – ’do not advance matters at all, but rather make things worse’. Grim enough as this conclusion is, Read goes on to suggest that the reality is, in fact, even worse: the history of philosophy makes it clear that there has ‘actually been the very opposite of progress [because] far from moving on from the days of Plato et al., we have in an important respect moved backward, precisely because we have combined a lack of moving on with an illusion of having moved on’.

The concerns that Read’s article raises are not new. Philosophers have often seemed to display striking anxieties about the question of the progressiveness, or not, of their discipline. Such worries have been exaggerated in recent years, in Britain at least, by such bureaucratic ills as the various incarnations of the Research Assessment Exercise. My concern in this paper is not with the question of how such questions of progressiveness are affected by changing conceptions of what philosophy is; that is too broad and complex an issue, even if it is a neglected one. Instead, my aim here is to challenge Read’s pessimistic judgements about the lack of progress that the history of philosophy allegedly exhibits by examining and rejecting his conception of progressiveness – and in turn by advancing and defending an alternative which is hopefully more attractive and more persuasive.

II. Progress in Science and Philosophy

Read opens his paper by arguing that ‘the type of progress exhibited by philosophy is not that exhibited by science’, but is, rather, ‘akin to the kind of progress exhibited (say) by someone becoming “older and wiser”’. This distinction is a welcome one. Although the question of what constitutes ‘scientific progress’ is

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4 For a sustained criticism of the Research Assessment Exercise which uses the resources of the history and philosophy of science, see Donald Gillies, How Should Research Be Organised? (London: College Publications, 2008).
still a contested one in the philosophy of science, the debate there really concerns questions about how one defines that progress – whether progress in science should invoke ‘non-epistemic’ as well as ‘epistemic’ values, say – rather than the foundational question of whether science does in fact progress. 6 Although an earlier generation of historians and philosophers of science, influenced by Kuhn’s alleged ‘relativism’, did for a time worry that science did not, and perhaps even could not progress through ‘paradigm shifts’, it can safely be said that few philosophers of science really doubt that science has not, in any substantial way, progressed. Therefore although many of the honorific terms that were once applied to the sciences – such as ‘rationality’ and ‘objectivity’ – have been challenged by a generation of ‘post-positivist’ historians and philosophers of science, it is uncontroversial enough to say that ‘progressive’ has persisted better than most. 7

The progressiveness of science is often cited as a prime cause of the anxieties of philosophers who worry about their own lack of progress. Enthusiasm for philosophical naturalism has remained strong throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, even to the point where two contemporary philosophers of science can unapologetically confess to a ‘frank scientism’ and urge that any discipline and subject which does not conform to the strictures of naturalism therefore ‘fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of truth, and should be discontinued’ because it threatens to disrupt ‘the great epistemic enterprise of modern civilization’ – namely, the modern sciences. 8 These remarks lend questions of the progressiveness of philosophy a new urgency, insofar as modern governments are tending to restructure higher education according to a technocratic agenda defined

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7 It is worth adding here that ‘post-positivist’ histories and philosophies of science do not deny that the sciences are rational or objective per se, but only that the conceptions of rationality and objectivity proffered by earlier positivist and logical positivist philosophers of science are inadequate and needed revising. For good examples, see Paul Feyerabend, *Farewell to Reason* (London: Verso, 1987) and Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone Books, 2007) on rationality and objectivity, respectively.

by national economic interests. The natural sciences and associated areas like medicine and engineering tend to do very well as a result since they are identified as lucrative sources of ‘transferable skills’, patents, new technological products and procedures and so on, whilst the arts and humanities, and perhaps certain areas of the social sciences, find themselves uncomfortably trying to justify their existence – and budgets – by scrabbling for legitimate ways to demonstrate their ‘impact’.

Read’s charge that philosophy has not progressed must therefore be set in a much wider social and political context, and not simply because it might lend ammunition to those who would do away with philosophy, theology, and the like as ‘artsy’ subjects with no concrete contributions to the national good. This is why it is important to provide a conception of philosophy which enables both lay and professional philosophers to insist that the subject does ‘progress’ in some legitimate sense; and our success in doing so reflects not only concerns about professional and disciplinary integrity and identity but also, perhaps, quite justified worries about the future of academic philosophy. Read’s conception of philosophical progress clearly does not offer resources for defending two important elements of the progressiveness of philosophy and so it should be rejected on both pragmatic and philosophical grounds. Pragmatically, it will not help philosophers to assert the validity of their discipline against the technocratic agenda of many modern governments and philosophically it fails to capture the sense in which philosophy contributes to human life – or so I will argue.

In what sense might philosophy be said to ‘progress’? Read offers two senses, what I will dub the ‘cumulative’ and the ‘maturational’. A cumulative conception of progress identifies a discipline or area of inquiry as progressive if over the course of its history it adds to the depth and range of one’s knowledge of a given area of inquiry and whether that enhanced mass of knowledge can be fruitfully applied to the resolution of practical or cognitive problems. It seems that this is often taken to be the \textit{de facto} conception of progress that is employed when writers consider the progressiveness of philosophy. Anthony Kenny, for instance, objects to the presumptive appeal to the cumulative conception of progress because philosophy is ‘not like a science which progresses by adding, age by age, new layers of information upon foundations laid by previously generations’. Philosophy, properly understood, offers ‘not information, but understanding’
and the latter is not something amenable to cumulative, quantitative measurement.\(^9\) The sciences, of course, are superlatively successful on such terms. Does philosophy exhibit progress in this cumulative sense? I do not intend to offer any definitive account of this but certainly there are good reasons to suppose that it does not; the old adage that there is ‘nothing new under the sun’ may be seen to apply within the history of philosophy because many of our current debates are continuations of arguments and speculations that began in the ancient period. Of course it is true that bad arguments have been weeded out, certain concepts clarified or sharpened, and the priority of certain questions and issues has fluctuated – but these do not constitute progress in the cumulative sense.

The ‘maturational’ conception of progress offers a different sense in which philosophy can be progressive, namely, the possibility that over the course of its history it has added to the stock of human wisdom. Read says less about what this might be, except that it is analogous to one’s ‘becoming wiser’ as one ages; for instance, he argues that Rawls ‘shows less wisdom and produces less clarity than was already present in Plato’s *Euthyphro*’ and so ‘succeeds only in pushing moral (and political) philosophy back to a stage inferior to that which it reached with Socrates’.\(^{10}\) Although Read introduces this maturational conception of progress as an alternative to the cumulative conception it is in fact only a variation on it. At the heart of both conceptions of progress is the idea that progress consists in the steady accumulation of a body of epistemic goods – either scientific knowledge or philosophical wisdom. This cumulative account of progress underwrites the maturational conception of progress which Read claims is a viable alternative to the cumulative conception; however, since it relies upon the same notion of progress as the cumulative growth of epistemic goods it illegitimately applies to philosophy a conception of progress drawn from the sciences. In so doing, an inadvertent scientism enters Read’s discussion and this is the source of his unfavourable judgement about philosophy’s alleged lack of progressiveness.

\(^9\) Anthony Kenny, *A Brief History of Western Philosophy* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 346, 347. One could add that such understanding is not something that can be discovered once – in ancient Greece, say – and then simply transmitted to the future; rather, such understanding must be something that is gained anew by each generation.

\(^{10}\) Read, ‘On Philosophy’s (Lack of) Progress’, p. 366.
Such implicit scientism is evident in Read’s appeal to Wittgenstein. During the opening pages of his paper, Read reports that Wittgenstein’s considered the idea of philosophy ‘as a subject that progresses’ to be a ‘ghastly and mythologically-grand error . . . if “progress” is to mean anything resembling its meaning in the case which tends to be our paradigm-case for the meaning of progress, namely (normal) science’. The conditional ‘if’ is significant here because it implies that Wittgenstein thought that philosophy could not be considered to be progressive according to the cumulative conception of progress. However, there is no good reason to suppose that Wittgenstein in fact had any enthusiasm for the cumulative conception of philosophy or for the scientistic attitude it would reflect – that attitude which sees the natural sciences as the models and exemplars for all human intellectual activity. Indeed, there are many passages in which Wittgenstein records his hostility towards such scientism; for instance, when he complains that ‘people nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them’ and so forget that ‘poets [and] musicians’ may also have ‘something to teach them’, or when he warns that ‘the age of science and technology’ may be the ‘beginning of the end for humanity’, as ‘our disgusting, soapy water science’ drowns out all else that is good and valuable in human life. Wittgenstein was no friend of scientism and would have rejected the idea that one could or should interpret the progressiveness, or not, of philosophy according to a conception of progress drawn from, and appropriate to the natural sciences.

There are more pressing difficulties with the idea that one can provide a quantitative or cumulative account of wisdom or how one could measure the value of moral and political philosophies from different historical and political periods. Wittgenstein’s notoriously enigmatic references to the importance of a ‘form of life’ might, for all their ambiguity, offer the possibility that one should always understand philosophies within their cultural or historical context. Wittgenstein’s acidic remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough indicate his disdain for those, like Frazer, who cannot conceive of the possibility that beliefs and practices which strike us as ludicrous or absurd – such as rain-dancing or shaman-
ism – may be perfectly intelligible and meaningful within alternative forms of life.\textsuperscript{13} It does not stretch the bounds of interpretation to suggest that a form of life can be understood as something like historical and cultural context, and this can prompt the point that philosophies are always products of one’s time – even if they do not emerge as part of an overarching ‘zeitgeist’, as Hegel proposed, they tend to reflect prevailing interests, trends, concerns and so on.

This may sound like the trivial observation that Plato was writing for fourth century BC Athens and Rawls for mid-to-late twentieth century liberal America; however, this point is far from trivial, especially because philosophers – especially those of an ‘analytical’ persuasion – often tend to neglect the importance of locating philosophies within their historical and cultural context.\textsuperscript{14} Read is surely wrong to compare Rawls and Plato in the way that he does, because such comparison obscures the importance of the intellectual and political conditions that they lived and thought within. It is not that Plato and Rawls cannot be compared, but that such comparisons do not automatically enable value judgements in the way that Read assumes they can. The persuasiveness and pertinence of a philosophical system or argument or idea of course depends not just upon their argumentative and evidentiary virtues but also their place within a wider intellectual and cultural context.

The history of philosophy itself indicates that modes of philosophical practice are historically and culturally variable; for instance, consider how differently philosophy is conceived and practiced in a medieval Christian monastery, a Zen Buddhist temple, and a modern academic department. Context introduces variations into intellectual and institutional structures, professional and vocational conceptions of philosophical practice, and metaphilosophical views about the aims and nature of philosophy and so it cannot be detached from the actual form and content of philosophical practice. As Bernard Williams neatly puts it, ‘We and our outlook are not simply in the same place at the same


\textsuperscript{14} For an engaging history of philosophy which emphasises the importance of historical and cultural context, see David E. Cooper, \textit{World Philosophies: An Historical Introduction}, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). See also the interesting autobiographical essays in A.P. Griffiths (ed.), \textit{The Impulse to Philosophise} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
time’. Once one appreciates that Plato and Rawls were operating within different contexts then Read’s unfavourable assessment of Rawls should be moderated. Once one builds a role for historical context into one’s conception of philosophy, a different picture should emerge of what would constitute the ‘progressiveness’, or not, of any given philosophy or philosopher.

### III. Context and History

One does not philosophise in a vacuum. The problems and questions which strike us as pertinent or significant are affected by a whole array of factors, ranging from economic conditions, prevailing social and political trends, and structures of guiding projects and values. These conditions are all historically and culturally variable and they shape the aims and goals of philosophy, the argumentative and presentational forms it can employ, and the types and range of questions that it would be meaningful and intelligible to ask.

A failure to appreciate the importance of context of course distorts our assessments of the merits and demerits of historically and culturally distant philosophers. Bas van Fraassen strikes me as guilty of failing to ‘contextualise’ in this sense when he writes that ‘the Trinity, the soul, haecceity’ and other medieval Christian doctrines ‘baffle’ us, even when considered in contrast with the ‘unimaginable otherness of closed space-times, event-horizons, [and] EPR correlations’. Although the philosophical and theological doctrines associated with haecceities and the like may indeed be complex and abstruse, the sense of ‘bafflement’ that van Fraassen refers to surely arises because those entities no longer resonate with our values, languages, and practices – they no longer reflect our guiding concerns and values in the way that they did for medieval Europeans. The historical and cultural context which gave those philosophies salience and significance has been replaced and this leaves many of their postulates and problems – like the ontology of the Trinity or haecceities – without ‘resonance’ in the modern world.

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Once one appreciates the importance of contextualisation, an alternative conception of philosophy could be advanced – a nascent one, but perhaps one with sufficient substance to sustain a more attractive account of how philosophy may ‘progress’. Philosophers respond, primarily but not exclusively, to certain prevailing worries, concerns, and preoccupations and changing cultural and historical conditions will render certain of these more or less salient; hence one sees the philosophy of religion losing its stature as secular modernism took hold into the twentieth century, at the same time as the philosophy of science became more influential. Of course, such changes can be reversed, whether gradually or rapidly, and the ‘wrecks’ that littered Kant’s ‘ocean of truth’ could well be recovered by future philosophical developments – and at the least, it is an epistemic injustice to future generations of philosophers to suppose that they cannot achieve what we cannot, especially since they may have the benefit of sharper concepts, refined arguments and so on.\footnote{Paul Feyerabend made a similar point about scientific theories: allegedly ‘falsified’ scientific theories could always be revived by future theoretical developments which are not always foreseeable. Feyerabend therefore urged us to ‘preserve’ such theories ‘for possible future use’ both because the process of scientific research ‘can change direction in surprising ways’ and also to insure us against the vicissitudes of ‘recurrent fashions’ (Feyerabend, \textit{Farewell to Reason}, London: Verso, 1987, p. 33); see also Feyerabend, \textit{Against Method}, 3rd ed. (London: Verso), chapter five. Today’s philosophical puzzles may become tomorrow’s crises, in which case we would be wise to insure ourselves against future disasters by acquainting ourselves with the wonderful store of ideas and cautionary tales that is the history of philosophy.}

The possibility that future philosophers will endow us with better tools for responding to certain questions and problems still preserves something of the cumulative conception of progress. However, the role of philosophical innovation should be seen as reflecting the fact that philosophers generally engage in philosophical reflections not primarily to contribute to the stock of well-developed arguments and refined concepts at their disposal, but because those tools could be usefully applied to certain issues and problems which drive them. Philosophers do not engage in what Simon Blackburn calls ‘conceptual engineering’ just because they find such engineering interesting and intellectually stimulating but, one hopes, because they further consider that those well-engineered concepts could be put to good use in helping us understand certain features of ourselves and our world.\footnote{Simon Blackburn, \textit{Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy}. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 4.}
course, there may be an intrinsic intellectual value to the sort of ‘nitty-gritty’ technical philosophy one finds in many of the journals – the ‘cut and thrust’ of debate, or exercise of intellectual skills – but one should surely hope that the problems of which those technicalities are a part are considered to be important or engaging ones in themselves. Certainly many if not all of the ‘great philosophers’ of history were motivated by these wider, ‘vital’ questions rather than by the technicalities of the arguments employed alone, and there is surely no contradiction in the fact that one can enjoy philosophical debate and argumentation whilst also remaining aware of the deeper issues those exchanges reflect.\(^{19}\)

The idea emerging is that philosophising should be motivated by and directed towards the achievement of understanding, either of particular issues or of deeper issues regarding when Henri Bergson called ‘the three Ws’ – ‘Where do we come from? What are we doing here? Whither are we going?’\(^{20}\) These three questions unpack the idea of philosophical understanding very well because they emphasise the contextual nature of philosophical progress. The understanding that would be reflected in any viable answers to these ‘three Ws’ would not be something that can be discovered once – in ancient Greece or India, say – and then simply transmitted to the future. Instead, such understanding must be something that is gained anew by each generation. As Geoffrey Scarre writes in a recent book on the philosophy of death, ‘many of the questions that philosophers tackle are not only hard but also are not suitably provided with once-and-for-all answers, being rather perennial foci of attention for thoughtful men and women.’ The fact that philosophers are still addressing certain issues – of political philosophy, say, to use Read’s example – does not indicate that philosophy reached its apogee with Plato, or that subsequent generations of philosophers have lacked the wit or will to properly engage with them but, as Scarre puts it,

\(^{19}\) An interesting historical story is waiting to be told about how the emergence of academic philosophy has affected conceptions of the aims and nature of philosophy. Certainly many trends in modern higher education tend to militate against older and the more ambitious metaphilosophies. For a specific case, see my ‘Education, Virtues, and Authenticity: The Case of Ernst Jünger, ‘Total Mobilisation’, and Academic Philosophy’, *Discourse* 10 (2011), forthcoming. The emergence of the modern ‘research university’ is treated in William Clark’s excellent *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

\(^{20}\) Cited in Cooper, *World Philosophies*, p. 3.
because such issues ‘need to be addressed afresh by the members of any society that considers itself civilized’. 21 The derogatory idea that philosophy is simply footnotes to Plato obscures the fact that each generation must readdress certain perennial questions – about life and death, good and evil, and so on – so that they may develop their own understanding of them, rather than just inheriting it and so reflect the changing values, practices and institutions that organise their lives.

An account of the progressiveness of philosophy should therefore include a due sensitivity to historical and cultural context. I propose that one should count a philosophy as ‘progressive’ if it reflects the prevailing values and concerns of the culture or period that generated it such that it can enable people to examine and understand their ideas about what the world is like and how one should comport oneself within it. Our conceptions of the value of philosophy – and of other intellectual pursuits, like the sciences – is necessarily driven by a conception of ‘the good’, of what constitutes a well-lived human life. 22 The philosophies one employs should provide us with resources for identifying and articulating those questions which arise as features of our ‘forms of life’ and which enable us to critically and reflectively engage with them. And this proposal is not a disguised form of intellectual and social conservatism, because the very process of critical reflection will, of course, open up the possibility that our values may be challenged or our ideas about ‘the good life’ deemed inadequate or in need of revision. The ‘progressiveness’ of a philosophy should therefore consist in its capacity to enable and sustain critical reflections upon the form of life we inhabit and the ways of being in the world that it opens up and encourages. 23

23 The conception of philosophy offered here is greatly indebted to the idea of ‘human philosophy’ defended by Williams and Cottingham. See Williams Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, and John Cottingham, ‘What is Humane Philosophy and Why is it At Risk?’, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Conceptions of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 233–255. For an alternative, but equally attractive conception of philosophy, see Mary Midgley’s remarks on ‘philosophical plumbing’ in her Utopias, Dolphins, and Computers: Problems of Philosophical Plumbing (London: Routledge, 1996).

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A philosophy is progressive, on these terms, if it enables one to chart and navigate the web of concepts and values which structure our lives and to critically engage with them. This contextualises philosophy in a way which requires us to redefine what it would mean for philosophy to be progressive: philosophical progress cannot consist in the accumulation of wisdom or of truths about the world because the ways in which truths and wisdom are conceived and valued will depend upon historically and culturally contingent conditions. As Foucault might put it, truth and wisdom themselves have histories and it is these histories, and the wider structures of thought and practice associated with them, which transform even our most abstract ideals into tangible features of our lives.

A progressive philosophy enables us to identify these structures and to critically examine them in a way that ensures we realise our obligations as moral and rational beings to articulate and affirm a conception of ‘the good life’. And as John Cottingham has recently argued, our awareness of the ‘radical contingency of the ethical’ should not cast us into despair. Our ‘social and ethical cultures’ shape us just as much as we shape them, and it is only by reflecting on those cultures that we can ensure that they fulfil their capacities to allow for the ‘flowering [and] cultivation . . . of those moral sensibilities and dispositions that are indispensable for human beings if they are to live together in a stable and mutually fulfilling way’.  

IV. Conclusions

The progressiveness of a philosophy should therefore be assessed according to its capacity to enable and sustain critical reflection upon the values and ideas which shape and inform human life. A venerable ‘body of wisdom’ may be a part of this, but only a part, because the salience of that wisdom will be informed by the ‘social

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24 John Cottingham, ‘The Good Life and the “Radical Contingency of the Ethical”’, in Reading Bernard Williams, Daniel Callcut (ed.), London: Routledge, 2008), p. 34. Cottingham’s assurance that awareness of the radical contingency of our ethical culture need not provoke despair could be challenged by appeal to the work of the early Heidegger and Sartre, who warned of the ‘Angst’ or ‘absurdity’ that awareness of contingency should in fact generate. For a discussion of these issues, see David E. Cooper, The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), chapters nine and ten.
and ethical cultures’ within which it is communicated and considered. Moreover, since those values and ideas – and the wider social and cultural context they inform – are historically and culturally variable, one cannot describe philosophy as progressing ‘over time’ or as accumulating ‘eternal verities’. Our estimations of the nature and value of truth and wisdom change according to our shifting conceptions of what the world is like and how best one ought to live within it. One should therefore reject Read’s earlier remark that ‘it would be better if some of these footnotes had never been written’ on the grounds that some of them ‘do not advance matters’ or even ‘make things worse’. Whether certain ‘footnotes’ in history – like Cartesian dualism or Cynic iconoclasm – contribute to our philosophising or not depends upon the contextual question of what questions matter to us. It is mere presentist hubris to suppose that our contemporary questions and concerns are shared by all other historical and cultural groups, past and future.

The history of philosophy offers us a growing repository of multiple ways of conceiving of and living within the world and the value of this resource can only grow with the increasing incorporation of the philosophical traditions of Asian and other world cultures. Read is therefore wrong in his conclusion that philosophy has not progressed over its history: the conception of philosophy this judgement relies upon and the idea of philosophical progress it sustains are erroneous because they fail to appreciate the importance of contextualising philosophical thought and practice. As long as philosophy and philosophers can successfully inspire and equip us to ask critical questions about who and what we are, and what matters to us and why, then they should indeed be counted as ‘progressive’. Finally, on an optimistic note, one could hope that the presence of an active and humane tradition in philosophy should see people asking and conceiving of new questions and demanding from philosophy new answers and resources for assessing them. If it is the case that such interactions

25 John Cottingham argues that one consequence of the widespread use of the ‘Harvard style’ of ‘author/date’ referencing in philosophy is that it promotes the idea that ‘our knowledge-base is enhanced, month by month and year by year, in small incremental steps (perhaps with occasional major breakthroughs); and in the catalogue of advances, the date tagged to each name signals when progress was made, and by whom’. Cottingham, ‘What is Humane Philosophy’, p. 233. It also obscures the historical dimension of philosophy, for instance by enabling one to refer to ‘Kant (1994)’.
can be sustained then there is no good reason to suppose that philosophy will ever cease to be progressive in the properly humane sense of encouraging and enabling critical reflection on who, what, and why we are.\textsuperscript{26}

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